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Abstract: This article discusses the work of George Udny Yule in relation to the evolutionary synthesis and the biometric-Mendelian debate.  It has generally been claimed that (i.) in 1902, Yule put forth the first account showing that the competing biometric and Mendelian programs could be synthesized. Furthermore, (ii.) the scientific figures who should have been most interested in this thesis (the biometricians W. F. Raphael Weldon and Karl Pearson, and the Mendelian William Bateson) were too blinded by personal animosity towards each other to appreciate Yule’s proposal.  This essay provides a detailed account of (i.), maintaining that Yule’s 1902 proposal is better understood as a reduction, not a synthesis of the two programs. The results of this analysis are then used to evaluate (ii.), where I will instead argue that Bateson and the biometricians had good reasons to avoid endorsing Yule’s account.    












The biometric-Mendelian debate has left a permanent imprint on the history of biology.  On one side, the famously brash team of Karl Pearson and W. F. Raphael Weldon led the biometricians in their statistical study of evolution as a gradual process due to continuous variation.  In opposition was the staunch William Bateson, who utilized his studies of hybridization experiments to justify a discontinuous theory of variation. While the theoretical dispute between the two sides is well known, it is the methodological disagreement that is most famous. Bateson and the biometricians disputed not only each other’s theoretical claims but also the very methods each used to gather evidence for those claims. Bateson sought causal explanations for the process of inheritance by employing experimental hybridizations.​[1]​ In contrast, Pearson and Weldon chided any attempts to seek out the causal mechanisms responsible for inheritance before enough statistical information was gathered. They, instead, searched for statistical correlations between phenomena. Much of Pearson’s Grammar of Science is devoted specifically to defending the proper development of scientific investigation.​[2]​ While he was not, in principle, opposed to causal explanations, these endeavors were only acceptable after statistics first identified the correct correlations to investigate.​[3]​ 
The division that emerged between the two scientific programs becomes most remarkable when the coinciding personal histories of Batson and Weldon are recounted. Bateson and Weldon were educated together at St. John’s College, Cambridge, under the guidance of biologist Francis Balfour. Both men joined Balfour in embryological, morphological, and phylogenetic studies of primitive animals, which straddled the line between vertebrate and invertebrate life. Bateson, from early in his academic career, became interested in the existence and importance of discontinuous variation. These investigations were first presented in the form of a study of segmentation patterns in the worm Balanglossus.​[4]​ Bateson then set out for Central Asia to collect and describe cases of discontinuous variation in the wild. In contrast, Weldon turned towards mathematics as a tool to investigate biology. He was impressed by the mathematical tools found in Galton’s Natural Inheritance, and so he set out on his own investigations of correlations found in the crustacean Crangon vulgaris.​[5]​ Bateson and Weldon remained close friends through most of the 1880’s, but Weldon became increasingly critical of Bateson’s speculations concerning the significance of discontinuous variation in evolution.​[6]​         
	Bateson utilized the data he had accumulated in Central Asia to compose his massive Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species.​[7]​ As the title suggests, Bateson heavily emphasized the importance of discontinuous variation in relation to speciation. The conflict between Bateson and Weldon first turned public when Weldon reviewed Bateson’s book and criticized the interpretation of Bateson’s data as confirming discontinuous variation.​[8]​ The polarizing sides were displayed again on the pages of Nature with a series of letters debating the significance of discontinuous variation in the evolution of the plant Cinerari.​[9]​  Finally, in the late 1890’s, Francis Galton organized the Evolution Committee for the Royal Society.  Ever the diplomat, Galton hoped the committee might cultivate both sides’ theoretical and methodological approaches to evolution and so asked Pearson, Weldon, and Bateson to join the group.  Unfortunately, Galton’s dream was not to be.  Differences proved too diverse, and by January 1900, Galton, Pearson and Weldon resigned from the committee and left it to Bateson’s rule.​[10]​
	It was in this environment that Mendel’s principles of inheritance reappeared just months later.  Bateson, preaching discontinuous evolution but without a complete understanding of the causal process responsible for discontinuity, saw in Mendel’s principles a solution to his dilemma: Mendel’s heritable factors could be utilized to justify the theory of discontinuous variation.  Bateson immediately set out to publish a variety of presentations of his discontinuity theory based on the principles of inheritance laid out by Mendel 35 years earlier.​[11]​
	Naturally, the biometricians felt a potential threat from Bateson’s Mendelian Messiah, and so in 1902, Weldon reviewed the work of Mendel and its application by Bateson in the biometricians’ journal Biometrika.​[12]​  Weldon began by admitting that the Mendelian theory of inheritance was one of importance and worthy of inspection.  Weldon was especially fond of the extensive data acquired by Mendel, a methodological criterion that the biometricians demanded in any rigorous investigation.  But Weldon was not willing to admit that Mendel’s principles could be universally applied to all forms of inheritance, as Bateson was arguing.  The bulk of Weldon’s review was the identification of the many research programs underway that did not consider heredity to be due entirely to the factors passed from parent to progeny but instead took into consideration the progeny’s ancestral line to determine expected traits. Weldon concluded, “The fundamental mistake which vitiates all work based upon Mendel’s method is the neglect of ancestry, and the attempt to regard the whole effect upon offspring, produced by a particular parent, as due to the existence in the parent of particular structural characters; while the contradictory results obtained by those who have observed the offspring of parents apparently identical in certain characters show clearly enough that not only the parents themselves, but their race, that is their ancestry, must be taken into account before the result of pairing them can be predicted.”​[13]​
	Weldon was referring to the biometric law of ancestral heredity first presented in its complete form by Galton in 1897.  Galton claimed, based largely on his analysis of a breeding record of Basset hounds, that a particular individual can be thought of as having inherited ancestral contributions from generations in an exponentially decreasing fashion.  “The two parents contribute between them on the average one-half, or (0.5) of the total heritage of the offspring; the four grandparents, one-quarter, or (0.5)2; the eight great-grandparents, one-eighth or (0.5)3, and so on.  Thus the sum of the ancestral contributions is expressed by the series (0.5)+(0.5)2+(0.5)3, etc., which, being equal to 1, accounts for the whole heritage.”​[14]​  For the biometricians, the ancestral law of heredity was the rule governing their statistical conceptions of heredity.  Weldon was willing to acknowledge that Mendel’s principles might be, at best, only a special case of the more general ancestral law.
	Bateson was quick to respond.  In his famous Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, a Defense, Bateson, with a religious fervor, lashed out at the criticisms put forth by Weldon.​[15]​ What Bateson feared most was the possibility that Weldon might upend Bateson’s efforts at cultivating the nascent field of experimental hybridization known by 1902 as “Mendelism”, the field that would eventually become genetics.  He wrote, “It was therefore with a regret approaching to indignation that I read Professor Weldon’s criticism.  Were such a piece from the hand of a junior it might safely be neglected; but coming from Professor Weldon there was the danger-almost the certainty-that the small band of younger men who are thinking of research in this field would take it they had learnt the gist of Mendel, would imagine his teaching exposed by Professor Weldon, and look elsewhere for lines of work.”​[16]​
	But after Bateson’s initial attack on Weldon, he immediately turned to voice his recognition concerning the importance of statistical applications to biology, as long as they were combined with experimental research.  Bateson admitted, “The study of variation and heredity, in our ignorance of the causation of those phenomena, must be built of statistical data, as Mendel knew long ago; but as he also perceived, the ground must be prepared by specific experiment.”​[17]​  The Mendelian even went on to praise the biometricians Pearson and Galton after lambasting their respected counterpart Weldon: “With sorrow I find such an article sent out to the world by a Journal bearing, in any association, the revered name of Francis Galton, or under the high sponsorship of Karl Pearson.  I yield to no one in admiration of the genius of these men.”​[18]​  
	British statistician George Udny Yule (1871—1951) was shocked by Bateson’s attack on Weldon. A close friend of Pearson, Yule would write soon after to him, “The man seems to have clean lost his head from the way he talks about Mendel: ‘wet dish clouts’ are rather good treatment for such style. He does not seem to realise that high falutin’ of that kind only tends to make one the more critical.”​[19]​ Yule was more than just a close friend of Pearson; he was also a biometrician. But despite his own biometric biases, Yule attempted to address the increasing tension between Bateson and the team of Pearson and Weldon and hoped to quell the fires on both sides of the debate in his 1902 article “Mendel’s Laws and Their Probable Relations to Intra-Racial Heredity.”  A trained engineer and physicist, Yule had quickly turned to statistics and became a demonstrator at University College London in 1893 at only 22.  This early post was a direct result of the elder Karl Pearson, who knew Yule as a student.  Yule found in Pearson a stimulating mentor and began a life-long study of statistics hampered only by “the war to end all wars” and persistent heart trouble late in life.  Yule’s practical applications of statistics to economics and sociological aspects of pauperism were extensive, but he became most famous for his work on correlation and association with Pearson and for his classic Introduction to the Theory of Statistics, which saw fourteen editions in Yule’s lifetime alone.​[20]​

Yule in the History of Biology
In the history of biology it is Yule’s 1902 paper on Mendel’s laws that has ensured him a footnote in any history of the evolutionary synthesis. What exactly was synthesized during this period remains a hotly debated issue.​[21]​ The matter is so complex in large part because there are a variety of different ways in which one might identify a synthesis. For example, Dudley Shapere  has claimed that there are at least three components of the evolutionary synthesis: the removal of objections to the compatibility of the Darwinian theory of evolution and the Mendelian picture of genetics, and the demonstration that these two theories can, in fact, support one another; second, the rethinking of these previous enterprises in terms of population level models; and third, the realization that other fields (such as paleontology, systematics, botany, zoology, and embryology) do not stand in opposition to the first two features.​[22]​ Shapere’s distinctions are a useful starting place; however, it is in need of further clarification. This is not a criticism of Shapere, for he readily concluded his discussion with the sentence, “However, this picture of the synthesis is almost certainly incomplete and oversimplified and subject to revision.”​[23]​ I will specifically address his first component: the removal of objections to the compatibility of Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. This point needs clarification because it is itself composed of several different elements. First, the biometric studies of continuous variation and the Mendelian studies of discontinuous variation had to be shown to be compatible. And second, there needed to be the realization that the biometric law of ancestral heredity did not stand in opposition to the Mendelian principles of inheritance. These clarifications of the relationship between biometry and Mendelism both had to be addressed before the more general compatibility of Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics could be deciphered. It is here that we can now understand and situate Yule’s place in the history of the evolutionary synthesis. He addressed the two elements that I mentioned above by showing how the processes of continuous and discontinuous variation were not incompatible and by demonstrating mathematically a relationship between the ancestral law of heredity and the principles of Mendelian inheritance.  
But the history of biology tells us that Yule’s peace offering fell on deaf ears.  The story goes: Bateson and the biometricians were so engulfed in their own personal disdain for each other, that they were unable to recognize the potential unification of the two theories as presented by Yule.  And so it was to be nearly two decades before R. A. Fisher put forth the popularized attempt to display the theoretical relationship between biometry, Darwin, and Mendel. This version of the history seems to have originated with several of the biologists, who directly contributed to this period. For instance, Sewall Wright, a figure generally regarded as an architect of the evolutionary synthesis, claimed in 1978, “The acrimonious debate that ensued [between the biometricians and the Mendelians] probably delayed experimental population genetics for several decades in England, that is, until Mather began his studies of what he called polygenic heredity.​[24]​  This was in spite of papers by the biometrician, Yule, in 1902 and 1906, showing that there was no irreconcilable difference between Galton’s purely statistical law, essentially a multiple regression equation, and a physiological law such as Mendel’s.”​[25]​
	Likewise, the influential Ernst Mayr, offered Yule a similar homage: “There was one outstanding exception at that period, the biometrician Yule.  As Provine points out, Yule recognized not only ‘that Mendelism and biometry were compatible but also even more crucial, that Mendelism and Darwin’s idea of continuous evolution were compatible.’  Yule, alas, was too far ahead of his time to be appreciated and it required many more years of tortuous argument before others arrived at the same conclusion.”​[26]​
This traditional tale has been internalized by historians of biology. For example, the most detailed account of Yule’s work comes from Mayr’s literary source—William Provine.   In The Origins of Population Genetics Provine paid special attention to the role of personal conflicts in the rise of population genetics and argued, “Yule’s approach of synthesizing Mendelism and biometry in the study of Darwinian evolution was submerged by the conflict.  His was the approach of population genetics.  Conflicts among his contemporaries prevented its development at this time.”​[27]​ And also, “Yule’s excellent [1902] paper had little effect upon the widening gap between the Mendelians and the biometricians.  Not until R.A. Fisher’s first genetical paper in 1918 was there an important attempt in England to follow the lead suggested by Yule.”​[28]​
We find a similar discussion of Yule from Raphael Falk who stated in 1991, based on Yule’s application of the multiple factor hypothesis, “A similar argument had been put forward already in 1902 by George Yule, who pointed out that the conflict between biometrical and Mendelian concepts of variation of quantitative characters was resolved if one assumed that many factors may cooperate in determining one character.  Instrumental reductionism was not incompatible with conceptual holism.  But to no avail.  Neither the advocates of continuous variation in evolution nor those of discontinuous variation were ready for the kind of explanation that resolved the conflict more than a decade later.”​[29]​ 
One other take on the reaction to Yule’s work has been simply to claim that it was ignored. The historian Daniel Kevles claimed, “The suggestion, as early as 1902, of the British statistician G. Udny Yule that Galton’s law and Mendelism actually complemented rather than contradicted each other was apparently ignored by Pearson.”​[30]​ As we will see below in the analysis of Pearson’s extensive reaction to Yule’s proposal, this statement is inaccurate. As a result, I will leave Kevles’ perspective out of the subsequent “received view”, since he is the only historian to make this claim.    
The story of Yule’s neglect is clear from both biologists and historians of biology: in 1902, Yule attempted the first synthesis of biometry and Mendelian inheritance, but the two schools of thought who should have been most interested in their relationship were too blinded by personal hatred to appreciate the union.  The biological community would have to wait until 1918 for Fisher to put forth his account in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh for a widely recognized unification.  It is not surprising that this brief story has become the common account of Yule.  Wright and Mayr are both regarded as two of the most influential architects of this period in the history of evolutionary biology; their interpretations are naturally revered.  Meanwhile, Falk and Provine are two exemplary historians of evolutionary biology.  Provine’s The Origins of Population Genetics, in particular, is one of the definitive studies of the biometric-Mendelian debate. In the pages that follow, I will argue that the picture of Yule painted by the figures above begins with a very limited understanding of Yule’s 1902 proposal and, thus, results in a mistaken conception of why Bateson and the biometricians did not endorse Yule’s suggestion. 
	The turn to Yule in analyzing the biometric-Mendelian debate shares a common focal point with some of the more recent investigations of this history. The motivation comes from understanding the debate not just from the primary players (Bateson, Pearson, and Weldon), but from the “second-tier” biologists who were associated with either Bateson or the biometricians. The hope is that, by taking one step back, a clearer picture of the theoretical base of the debate emerges that is not necessarily bogged down in some of the personal disagreements between the primary individuals. This investigation of the second-tier figures can be found in Rachel Ankeny’s investigation of A.D. Darbishire’s supposed conversion from biometry to Mendelism, and in Kyung-Man Kim’s analysis of the emergence of “scientific consensus” in the debate.​[31]​

Fisher’s Reduction of the Law of Ancestral Heredity to the Mendelian Principles of Inheritance

	The best place to begin understanding Yule’s 1902 discussion is actually with an article that came 16 years later: R.A. Fisher’s “Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance.”​[32]​  This comparison makes sense for several reasons.  First, though the evolutionary synthesis is much debated and has been placed on the shoulders of several biologists, Fisher is generally regarded as the first to successfully put forth a theory of the relationship between biometry, Darwinian evolution, and Mendelian inheritance.  That theory first emerged in the 1918 article.  Secondly, Fisher, like Yule, was a trained biometrician and in close contact with Pearson.  This fact meant that both men were familiar with similar statistical approaches to biology.  Finally, Fisher’s theory is considered to be a direct descendent of Yule’s earlier suggestion.  Fisher himself admitted in the introduction of his article that “the subject had been previously opened by Udny Yule.”​[33]​
	It is interesting to point out here that Yule may have played more than just an indirect role in pointing Fisher to the relationship between biometry and Mendel.  He may have personally reviewed Fisher’s early theoretical investigations.  In 1915, as Fisher was formulating the relationship between biometry and Mendelian inheritance, he was in constant correspondence with Leonard Darwin, the son of Charles Darwin and President of the Eugenics Education Society.  Much of Fisher’s early (pre-1930) correspondence is no longer in existence, but Darwin’s letters to Fisher have been collected by J.H. Bennett in Natural Selection, Heredity, and Eugenics.​[34]​  In a letter to Fisher, Darwin discussed Fisher’s considerations of evolution and selection and then suggested, “if you did intend to write something, whether it would not be best to write out your remarks in their final form, and submit them to Yule, or get us to do so.  I should be bound to get assurances you were on the right track before publishing in our journal.”​[35]​ It is unknown whether or not Fisher heeded this advice.  
The most important aspect of Fisher’s work for our discussion is the fact that it is potentially misleading to even call it a “synthesis”.  The now-famous “synthesis” locution used to describe the work of Fisher (along with other figures such as Haldane, Wright, and Mayr) came twenty-four years after Fisher’s 1918 presentation, initiated largely by Julian Huxley and his Evolution: the Modern Synthesis.​[36]​ The title of the work (“The Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance”) best explains Fisher’s theory: if one first supposes Mendelian inheritance, then one can derive the correlation between relatives, resulting in the ancestral law of heredity.  Sahotra Sarkar has pointed out that it makes more sense to understand Fisher as providing a reduction of biometry’s law of ancestral heredity to Mendelian heredity, rather than as generating a synthesis of the two. This is because the two programs, on Fisher’s model, did not contribute equally to the understanding of inheritance and evolution; rather, Fisher took the Mendelian principles of inheritance as the explanatory base and then derived the biometric law of ancestral heredity to show that the statistical law was just a special case of the physiological law.​[37]​ The two theories were not equals, as a synthesis would imply; biometry’s ancestral law was just a mathematical consequence of Mendel’s principles. 
Of course, it might be argued that a reduction is just a special case of a synthesis. On this line, a “synthesis” is just understood as a union of two theories, and so a reduction is one way to unite theories, making it a special case of the more general synthesis. I have no problem with conceptualizing the connection between reduction and synthesis in an instance-kind relationship; however, the trouble emerges when Fisher’s work is understood only as a synthesis, and when the reductive aspect is left out. As we will see below, without an appreciation for how Fisher utilizes a reduction to explain the relationship between biometry and Mendelism, we are ill-equipped to evaluate Yule’s own proposal and also to recognize the relationship between the two biometricians’ work. In addition to Sarkar’s concern, I take this to be the more serious deficiency of using the “synthesis” locution to capture the work of these biometricians.   
An understanding of the reductive (rather than synthetic) nature of Fisher’s proposal is best understood when we turn to his own paper of 1918. In section 17 of this article, Fisher discussed the coefficient of correlation between generations while taking into consideration the effects of dominance and the environment.  He then derived the results of Mendelian crosses with the correlation coefficients included and found that there was a direct, mathematical relationship between successions of generations.  This was similar to the identification of ancestral heredity that Galton derived in 1897.  Fisher concluded his discussion of the relationship between biometry’s statistical law and Mendel’s physiological principles by pointing out that he came upon “the Law of Ancestral Heredity as a necessary consequence of the factorial mode of inheritance.”​[38]​

Yule’s  Reduction of the Mendelian Principles of Inheritance to the Law of Ancestral Heredity

It was important to first point out the nature of Fisher’s explanation because, as we will see, Yule’s explanation of the relationship between Mendel and biometry bears a striking similarity to Fisher’s, but with one very important difference.  To identify the similarities and the difference between Yule and Fisher, I will outline the several steps Yule took to arrive at his comparison between Mendel and biometry.  His first step was his most important; however, this step is conspicuously absent from the historical discussions of his work that I cited earlier.  It is true that Yule eventually discussed the possibility of a compatible relationship between ancestral heredity and Mendelian inheritance, but he only attempted to define this relationship after he demarcated the scientific domains of each field of study.  The relationship between the biometric and Mendelian theories cannot be understood until the differences between the theories are first appreciated.  
Yule demarcated the domains by a process of conceptual clarification. An interest in conceptual clarification was not uncommon for Yule. For instance, in a 1901 letter to Pearson, Yule demanded Pearson make clear the difference between “regression coefficient” and “reversion”, writing, “If you have got an article on nomenclature on hand I wish you would alter the word ‘regression coefficient’. The confusion between the original meaning of reversion towards type and regression coefficient is horrid. The ‘regression’, in [the] sense of reversion, is measured rather by 1-r(σ1/σ2), i.e. r(σ1/σ2) would be better termed the co-regression. Personally, I should like to call r(σ1/σ2) ‘the deviation ratio’ or some such term and confine the word ‘regression’ to the sense of reversion to type.”​[39]​
Yule applied his process of conceptual clarification to the biometric-Mendelian debate by focusing on the term “heredity”. For the general biologist, Yule claimed, heredity is just a notion of “like begets like”; “a character may be said to be inherited when it always, in one generation after another, is one of the characters of the species, of the race, or of the one sex of the race, as distinct from the other.”​[40]​  But Yule told his reader that there was a further question of heredity that also must be answered: even if the type of the race is constant, do individual types within the race beget their likes?  “It is to this question that statisticians have confined themselves, and they speak of a character being ‘inherited’ or not according as the answer to the question is yes or no—they deal solely with what we may term ‘individual heredity.’”​[41]​  
	For Yule, it was the realization that the two scientific programs were concerned with two different forms of heredity that was most important to any clarification because this was the first step that must be taken to appreciate both biometric and Mendelian programs. He wrote, “The distinctions between continuity and discontinuity of variation, between inheritance of attributes and of variables do not seem to me to be of necessary importance for the theory of heredity; successive discontinuities may be so slight as to be undiscoverable by the most careful and repeated measurements.  The real and important distinction seems to lie between the phenomena of heredity within the race, and the phenomena of hybridization that occur on crossing two races admittedly distinct.”​[42]​ Yule rightly emphasized the differences between the two theories because, up until that point, each side was attempting to use the data supporting their own theory to disprove the conclusions of the other research program.  Bateson believed his experimental crosses undermined the ancestral law of heredity, and the biometricians believed their statistical results disconfirmed Bateson’s account of Mendelian inheritance.  But when the domains of the two theories are demarcated, the results of each theory can be appreciated separately without opposition.  Yule’s initial point—that biometry’s study of continuous variation and Bateson’s study of discontinuous variation are not incompatible—is often what gets cited by historians.​[43]​ But it is important to keep clear what history has emphasized for Yule and what he himself believed to be the important points of his discussion.  This will be essential for understanding the remainder of his 1902 paper.
	Yule first determined that biometry is concerned with heredity within a race (intra-racial heredity), and Mendelism instead is focused on hybridization between races (inter-racial heredity).  Yule’s next move was to discuss what he took to be the most fundamental fact in biology—the biometric law of ancestral heredity.  He recognized the potential importance of Mendelian heredity, but experimental evidence had not accumulated to justify its generality by 1902.  Moreover, Yule pointed out the fact that Bateson and his colleague Edith Saunders, “like other observers, found some difficulties and exceptions, notably in the case of Matthiola hybrids and in the experiments with poultry.”​[44]​ The law of ancestral heredity, contrarily, had been successfully shown to apply to data from many different species at this point.  Yule listed the application to Daphnia, Aphis, Lemma, coat-color in horses and Basset hounds, and eye-color in man.  He concluded, “the list is not a long one certainly, but the characters and the genera are so extraordinarily diverse that the law must be one of very great generality.”​[45]​  This “great generality” which Yule identified in the law of ancestral heredity but which he was not yet willing to attribute to Mendel’s principles is the first important point to glean from his 1902 discussion of ancestral heredity.
	The second point that Yule made which is vital to our discussion concerns how he actually defined the law of ancestral heredity because it was quite different from how his biometrical colleagues defined the law.  He admitted from the very beginning of his discussion of the law that he used “the term ‘Law of Ancestral Heredity’ in a sense somewhat wider than that given by Professor Pearson.”​[46]​  The ancestral law, as defined by Galton, remember, was a mathematical relationship of heritable contributions from various generations.  The parents contributed half of the heritage to the offspring; the grandparents contribute one-quarter; the great-grandparents contribute one-eighth, and so on.  Both Galton and Pearson believed that this strict, mathematical relationship formulated as such could accurately account for the hereditary contribution of any given ancestor and act as a universal law.  But Yule did not believe this universal application was accurate. He pointed out that Pearson called the equation “The Law of Ancestral Heredity”, but Yule chose “to drop that signification, as [Yule did] not think the facts indicate any fixity of formula even for intra-racial heredity.”​[47]​ If Yule did not admit of Pearson and Galton’s form of the ancestral law, then how did he conceive it?  Yule’s answer was as follows: “the mean character of the offspring can be calculated with the more exactness, the more extensive our knowledge of the corresponding characters of the ancestry, may be termed the Law of Ancestral Heredity”.​[48]​ So, for Yule, the ancestral law was not so much a rigid, mathematical equation for computing the given contributions from specific generations as it was a much wider acknowledgement concerning the ability to better predict the mean of any trait with more knowledge of the ancestry.  This very general definition is quite different from the law espoused by Pearson and the other biometricians.
	We have now identified the two important aspects of Yule’s analysis of the law of ancestral heredity: first, the ancestral law was found across a range of biological species, so it should be considered one of the most general of all biological principles.  Second, the law, formulated by Pearson and Galton, often did not provide an accurate account of inheritance, so the law should be defined as no more than a description of an increasing ability to make predictions based on an increasing knowledge of the ancestral lineage.  
	With the law presented, Yule then began considering how the ancestral law for intra-racial heredity and the Mendelian principles for inter-racial heredity might be related.  “Little work has yet been done on the intra-racial inheritance of attributes, but the form which the law of ancestral heredity would take in such a case is fairly obvious.”​[49]​  The biometrician hoped to define how the distribution of Mendelian attributes (commonly termed “A” and “a”) might be predicted on the basis of the ancestral law.  He decided, “the percentage of A’s and a’s amongst the offspring can be calculated with the more exactness, the more extensive our knowledge of the corresponding characters in the ancestry.”​[50]​  Notice that this is in the exact same form of Yule’s ancestral law of inheritance except that “the mean character” has now been replaced by “the percentage of A’s and a’s.”   Yule began with his unique definition of the very general law of ancestral heredity and then applied it to the case of Mendelian characters.  
	Yule first gave a brief definition of how to consider the Mendelian characters behaving under the predictive power of the ancestral law of heredity.  He next performed a thought experiment by asking what would happen if the “two races A and a are left to themselves to inter-cross freely as if they were one race.”​[51]​  I quote the next paragraph in its entirety because it is essentially Yule’s attempt to mathematically determining the relationship between the Mendelian principles and the biometric ancestral law.
Consider then the successive generations of posterity of the dominant forms, starting, say, with 300 of which 100 are pure.  The 100 pure individuals will give rise to dominant forms in the proportion of 50 pure to 50 hybrids; the 200 hybrids may, as segregation takes place, be considered as 100 pure dominants and 100 pure recessives, the former giving rise to 50 pure dominants and 50 hybrids, the latter to 50 hybrid dominants and 50 pure recessives.  The 300 parent dominants, therefore, give rise to offspring in the proportion of 250 dominant forms to 50 recessive, i.e., the chance of a dominant parent producing a dominant form as offspring is 5/6.​[52]​




                                         200 (hybrid)
“segregation”: 

1st gen.:        100 (pure dominant)	     100 (pure dominant)	     100 (pure recessive)	

2nd gen.: 50 (pure dom.) 50 (hybrid)  50 (pure dom.) 50 (hybrid)  50 (hybrid) 50 (pure rec.)   

Figure 1: Diagram of Yule’s thought experiment for intra-racial crossing


Before I turn to the conclusions Yule draws from his thought experiment, it is important to take a moment to examine the actual details of Figure 1. This is because, on close inspection, it becomes clear that the biometrician misunderstood the nature of Mendelian inheritance at several points, making the his proposed connection between the ancestral law and the Mendelian principles particularly problematic.​[53]​ For instance, Yule treated individuals as gametes in the statement, “the 200 hybrids may, as segregation takes place, be considered as 100 pure dominant and 100 pure recessive”. This leads to the initial division in Figure 1 of the 200 hybrids into the 100 pure dominant and the 100 pure recessive of the 1st generation. We see here conflation on Yule’s part between the level of individual organisms and the level of the gametes they produce. Additionally, Yule clearly was confused about what the Mendelians meant by the “pure” homozygous state (both the dominant and the recessive). This is apparent both when he claimed that the 100 pure dominant produced 50 pure dominant and 50 hybrid, and when he supposed that the 100 pure recessive produced 50 pure recessive and 50 hybrid. This confusion on Yule’s part is particularly odd because just two pages earlier in his paper he pointed out, “these ‘extracted’ recessives—to use Bateson’s convenient terminology—breed pure, i.e. never give rise again to the dominant form.”​[54]​ A final point of confusion comes not from the quote above but from a broader trend in Yule’s essay, which has implications for Yule’s thought experiment—this was the habit of Yule to move back and forth between the somatic, trait-based notion of A and a (namely, A is pure dominant, Aa is hybrid dominant, and a is pure recessive) and the gametic, allelic-based notion of A and a (or, AA is pure dominant, Aa is hybrid dominant, and aa is pure recessive). This shifting makes it difficult for the historian to determine which state Yule believed he was investigating in his discussions. In the analysis that follows I turn to what Yule thought he could conclude from his thought experiment and leave his mistakes behind. This is because it was these inferred conclusions that generated for Yule the relationship he proposed between biometry and Mendelism. And subsequently, it was this relationship that received the responses from the biometricians and Bateson. Nevertheless, it was worthwhile identifying these mistakes in Yule’s analysis if only to keep in mind the fact that the relationship Yule proposed was a faulty one. 
Yule utilized the numbers from what I have called the “second generation” to assess the implications of his thought experiment. The highlighted forms of Figure 1 are the numbers Yule used to establish his value of 5/6, with the one recessive form in italics. This value of 5/6 is just what the biometrician believed he needed to then make consistent predictions about future progeny.  Based on the distribution above, Yule claimed that “quite generally one-half of the pure dominants and one-quarter of the hybrids of any generation give rise to pure dominants as offspring, while the remaining half of the pure dominants and one-half of the impure give rise to hybrid forms.”​[55]​  Yule proceeded with the following calculations (the numbered equations are his own; Tn denoted the total number of dominants in the nth generation, pn is pure, and in is impure or a hybrid):
(5) pn+1 = 1/2 pn + 1/4  in
(6) in+1 = 1/2 pn + 1/2 in = 1/2 Tn
If these two equations are added together, then
(7) Tn+1 = Tn – 1/4 in
Or by equation (6) above
(8) Tn+1 = Tn – 1/8 Tn-1
This equation can be divided on both sides by Tn to provide the equation
(9) Cn = (Tn+1)/ Tn
Cn here is just the chance of a dominant form of the nth generation producing dominant offspring, so the final equation becomes
(10) Cn = 1 – 1/(8Cn-1)
Yule already calculated the correlation coefficient of C1 to be 5/6.  This number could then be plugged in for successive generations to determine what the probability of a particular generation exhibiting the dominant trait was if a given form was dominant.  Yule did the math himself for five generations and provides the following results:
C1 = .83333, C2 = .85000, C3 = .85294, C4 = .85345, C5 = .85354
Yule concluded, “The figures illustrate as nicely as could be desired the two chief properties of Ancestral Heredity—(i.) the chance of an A producing an A is increased if the ancestry be also A’s.  (ii.) it is not of much use to take into account more than the first few generations of ancestry, for the chance C rapidly approaches a limiting value. Mendel’s Laws, so far from being in any way inconsistent with the Law of Ancestral Heredity, lead then directly to a special case of that law”.​[56]​ Yule then went on to consider the relationship between Mendel’s principles and his version of the ancestral law in cases where either dominance or predetermination (i.e., the somatic attributes are rigidly fixed by the gametes) failed, where he ultimately came to the same conclusion as above: his very general notion of the law of ancestral heredity was the general rule for understanding inheritance, while the Mendelian principles, where applicable, could generally be considered “a special case of that law.”​[57]​  
For Yule, application of Mendel’s ratio to the ancestral law just resulted in unique formulations of the more general biometric law. Yule took his version of the law of ancestral heredity to be the explanatory base because it provided the most generalized account of inheritance in 1902, in contrast to the limited applicability of the Mendelian principles. With that base set, he then demonstrated that the Mendelian principles could often be mathematically deduced from the ancestral law. Like Fisher, Yule provided a reductive account of the relationship between the Mendelian rules for inheritance and the law of ancestral inheritance: one theory stood as the explanatory base, while the other was a special case of that more general theory. However, their reductions have one important difference between them, and it is to that difference that I now turn. 

Comparing the Reductions of Fisher and Yule
Yule attempted to reconfigure the Mendelian principles in terms of the ancestral law.  But this is the very opposite of the move that Fisher made!  Fisher believed the Mendelian principles of inheritance provided the basic theory of inheritance upon which all other accounts should be based, and so he showed that the mathematics utilized in the biometric law of ancestral heredity could be reduced to the mathematics utilized to analyze a randomly mating population made up of Mendelian unit-characters.  But Yule took the reduction in exactly the opposite direction.  His unique characterization of the law of ancestral heredity was supposed to be the standard theory by which all other theories of inheritance were measured, and so he used it to judge the results of Mendelian characters being passed down an ancestry. For Fisher, the ancestral law was a special case of the Mendelian principles. For Yule, the Mendelian principles were a special case of the ancestral law. With just the term “synthesis”, the historian is limited to identifying only the fact that both Yule and Fisher proposed a relationship between the ancestral law and the Mendelian principles. This is exactly what we found in the perspectives on Yule offered by Mayr, Provine, and Wright earlier.​[58]​ But the important difference between Yule and Fisher identified above emerges only when their models are reevaluated as reductions.  
	The events that occurred between 1902 and 1918 in the investigations of inheritance give evidence for why Yule would have taken his reduction in one direction, and Fisher would have taken it in the exact opposite direction just 16 years later.  In 1902, as I mentioned above, Mendel’s principles lacked an extensive amount of experimental evidence to justify their generality in nature. Mendel’s paper from 1865 reappeared only two years earlier, and, by the tone of Bateson’s Defense, it is clear that there was a very limited number of biologists interested in taking the time to experiment with the hybridizations that would study Mendel’s principles.  Between 1902 and 1918, though, the biological community saw major shifts in its theoretical and methodological emphases.  In 1903, Wilhelm Johannsen released the results of his studies on pure-line experiments using lines of the bean Phaseolus vulgaris.  Johannsen utilized the biometrical methodologies but came to the conclusion that a heritable character could continuously evolve to only a certain degree before it became static and required a discontinuous variation to begin changing again.​[59]​ Later attempts to derive biometric results from Mendelian principles came from American biologist Edward East and Swedish biologist Hermann Nilsson-Ehle, who provided Mendelian interpretations of what appeared to be continuous variation.​[60]​ Also during this period Bateson was able to begin gathering around himself both the personnel, such as R.C. Punnett along with a variety of female colleagues at Newnham College, and the financial resources from several donors, to construct the growing field of genetics.​[61]​ The most notable work in this fifteen-year span came from Thomas Morgan and his colleagues at Columbia where they studied the chromosomes of Drosophila.  After 1909, Morgan based his entire chromosome theory upon the Mendelian principles of inheritance.  Fisher, but not Yule, had the gift of an extra 16 years worth of experimental hindsight to reevaluate which theory of inheritance held up to rigorous investigational scrutiny, and so which theory deserved to be the reducer and which would be the reduced.

Pearson and Bateson React to Yule’s Proposal
	As I discussed above, the received view in the history of biology has claimed that Yule’s synthesis was overlooked by the biometricians and by Bateson because they were blinded by their personal animosity for each other.  I will now argue that, based upon the understanding of Yule’s 1902 discussion of the relationship between the ancestral law of heredity and the principles of Mendelian inheritance as a reduction, both the biometricians and Bateson had good reasons to avoid endorsing Yule’s thesis. By “good reasons”, I simply want to contrast the theoretical issues I discuss below with the more traditional focus on the acrimonious nature of the debate between the two research groups as the source for disagreeing with Yule’s reduction. This is not to say that the irrational, personal matters of Pearson and Bateson played no role in assessing Yule’s work; rather, this is an attempt at situating their responses along a more rational axis—an avenue that has been neglected when discussing Yule’s 1902 paper. The biometric-Mendelian debate certainly was an acrimonious one, but Pearson’s and Bateson’s responses to Yule’s reduction only make complete sense when the form of Yule’s reduction, with a very generalized notion of the law of ancestral heredity at the base and the Mendelian principles reduced to it, is understood.   
	Yule began discussing with Pearson his interest in the relationship between biometry and Mendelian inheritance as early as the summer of 1901. Yule was quite excited about his ideas at this early stage, writing to Pearson, “There is very little of the ‘physico’ in my theory and I only deal with simple blended inheritance. On the other hand, it seems to knock the bottom out of our present views and that is why I am really very anxious to get the first part ready for you as soon as I can.”​[62]​ This enthusiasm, though, quickly subsided as Yule became overwhelmed by the enormity of dealing with such a large issue. He admitted to Pearson in mid-August, “As you say, I have got rather a big subject and the more I go with it, the more I feel I want time to go with details and test it fairly before publishing. I had no idea when I started…that it would work out so big.”​[63]​ 
Pearson encouraged Yule’s work but also warned him not to overexert himself, as the research was not in competition with any other such investigations, saying, “I want to send you a line because I am a bit worried about you tonight. You looked a little overdone and I fear you are worrying too much over your heredity problems. I don’t think you should rush the paper…Other investigations don’t seem likely to be about [it], so don’t hesitate to leave the thing for a month or two.”​[64]​ As it turned out, Yule would not have the time to take off from his project. Just months later, Bateson published his vitriolic Defense.​[65]​ Yule’s project was large, but he worked up the model for the biometric-Mendelian relationship and sent it for publication. Interestingly, though the work was obviously of interest to both Mendelians and biometricians, Yule avoided sending the work to Biometrika, under Pearson and Weldon’s command, or to the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, under Bateson’s control. Instead, Yule chose the neutral journal The New Phytologist founded in that same year by the ecologist Arthur Tansley. Why did Yule select such a young journal devoted solely to the study of the botanical sciences? One reason, as I mentioned just above, was the fact that it was not mired in either side of the dispute between the biometricians and the Mendelians. Another reason can be found in the Editorial, which introduced the first issue of the journal by explaining part of the motivation for The New Phytologist as follows, “It must be within the experience of most of us that observations are constantly being made and views suggested, which at present never see the light because their authors are engaged on other work, and lack the time or perhaps the inclination to follow them up…[T]here are special cases in which it is desirable, and authors may find the new journal a convenient medium for announcing discoveries or theories which seem to call for immediate publication.”​[66]​ Two features are mentioned above about this blossoming journal that made it a perfect venue for Yule’s proposal. First, Yule was a statistician, not a biologist of any sort. As a result, the time Yule devoted to the issues surrounding inheritance was extremely limited in comparison to the other biometrical investigations he performed. In fact, Yule would only discuss the relationship between the ancestral law and the Mendelian principles one more time after his 1902 essay in a short, three-page discussion presented at the 1906 Conference on Genetics.​[67]​ This made Tansley’s The New Phytologist an excellent format, since Yule’s reflections on the biometric-Mendelian debate was a perfect example of a scientist’s observations “being made and views suggested, which at present never see the light because their authors are engaged on other work.”​[68]​ And second, the fact that the journal was intended to be “a convenient medium for announcing discoveries or theories which seem to call for immediate publication” made The New Phytologist a very suitable site for Yule to quickly address the impending storm created by Weldon’s criticism and Bateson’s response.​[69]​ In light of the fact that Tansley was not involved in the biometric-Mendelian debate to any extent and that Tansley’s journal was a good fit for the nature of Yule’s 1902 proposal, it is not surprising that Yule sent his attempted mediation of the dispute to The New Phytologist.                
Pearson replied directly to Yule’s published account just two months later in Biometrika.​[70]​  Pearson, interestingly, began by emphasizing that he agreed with the major point of Yule’s discussion.  “With much of his paper, I agree, for example, with his insistence on the point that the laws of intra-racial heredity are not incompatible with Mendelian principles holding for hybridization.”​[71]​ So Pearson did recognize Yule’s point about the potential compatibility between biometry and Mendelism. However, the biometrician quickly turned to discuss a point of dissent because, “Mr. Yule does not seem to me to have clearly expressed my personal position with regard to the law of ancestral heredity.”​[72]​  Remember that Yule chose to redefine the ancestral law in a very general format because he claimed the strict mathematical structure of Pearson and Galton could not stand up to experimental data.  Pearson, however, argued his own, “memoir of 1898 [discussing the law of ancestral heredity] adopted the simpler hypothesis that the correlation coefficients decrease in geometrical progression, it did not involve the fixity of the numerical constants of heredity which Mr. Yule tells us has not stood the test of time.  This simpler hypothesis…still seems to me to stand the test of time.”​[73]​  Pearson was claiming that he agreed with Yule in so far as there would be no strict application of universal constants to the ancestral law, but he disagreed with Yule in concluding that this meant there was no geometrical progression at all to the law.  Pearson stood firm on his belief that the correlation coefficients did decrease in a geometrical progression.  Since Pearson was unwilling to give up the mathematical nature of the ancestral law, then he surely would have been unreceptive to the very general form of the law put forth by Yule, which only allowed for better prediction with better knowledge of the ancestral line.    
	Pearson, one year later, published his own account of the possible relationship between the law of ancestral heredity and the principles of Mendelian inheritance in his famous series of articles on the mathematical contributions to the theory of evolution titled, “On a Generalised Theory of Alternative Inheritance, with Special Reference to Mendel’s Laws.”​[74]​ It is worth mentioning here that there is no written account of Weldon’s response to Yule’s article; however, the 1904 essay by Pearson was the result of months of work with Weldon on the topic of a possible relationship between biometry and Mendelism, so we can essentially take Pearson’s discussion to also be representative of Weldon.​[75]​  Pearson, in fact, dedicated the article to Weldon stating, “I owe the incentive of this memoir to Professor W.F.R. Weldon, who had already worked at some of the simpler special cases and who placed his results entirely at my disposal.”​[76]​ 
Pearson judged the validity of what he termed the Mendelians’ pure gamete theory: “the gamete remains pure, and the gametes of two groups, while they may link up to form a complete zygote, do not thereby absolutely fuse and lose their identity.”​[77]​  This was in contrast to the concept of blending inheritance defended by the biometricians.  Pearson argued that the Mendelian theory may be worked together with the biometricians’ statistical methodology, but if the mathematical results of the coordination do not coincide with the data gathered by the biometricians, then “we are bound to discard it, and seek for its modification or replacement.  The present study is an attempt to see how far one generalised pure gamete theory leads to results in accordance with the law of regression and the known nature of the distribution of offspring in populations.”​[78]​ 
	Pearson began by assuming what he took to be the Mendelian notion of complete dominance.  He then derived the parental and grand-parental correlation coefficients that resulted from the statistical analysis of the pure gamete theory breeding randomly in a population.  The biometrician did not find the two research programs, in principle, to be incompatible, and so he was able to calculate the parental coefficient to be 1/3 and the grand-parental coefficient to be 1/6.  Pearson added, “Now these results are of very singular importance.  A very general theory of the pure gamete type leads to linearity of the regression curve, a result amply verified by observations on inheritance in populations…Further, the value of the correlation reached is numerically identical with the value obtained by Francis Galton in his original investigations on the inheritance of stature!  The generalized theory of the pure gamete is thus shown, whatever the number of couplets taken, to lead to precisely the chief results already obtained by those who have studied heredity statistically.”​[79]​ But Pearson’s initial applause of the two programs’ compatibility was quickly replaced by doubt, for the values obtained by Galton in 1885 were greatly “refined” by the biometricians in subsequent years.  The parental coefficient, rather than being equal to 1/3 as it was in 1885, was, in 1903, identified as being closer to 1/2.  And, similarly, the grand-parental coefficient was not 1/6 but instead 1/4.  Pearson’s generalized theory of the pure gamete led directly to the biometric notion of regression, but the values were too strict to account for the biometrician’s observed phenomena.  Pearson sarcastically added, “It is most unfortunate for this general theory of the pure gamete, that it throws the Mendelian back into the position of the biometrician of 1885.”​[80]​
	The debate between Pearson and Yule turned on the form of the law of ancestral heredity.​[81]​ In contrast to the biometrician’s methodological disagreement with Bateson concerning the proper way to study biology, Pearson and Yule’s dispute was not subject to this problem, as both men approached biology with statistical investigations. They were both biometricians. Yule and Pearson simply disagreed over whether correlation coefficients decreasing in a geometric progression could be included in the ancestral law, or whether the law only pointed to increased predictive capabilities with increased knowledge of the ancestral line.  	
	Turning now to Bateson, Yule and the Mendelian corresponded frequently and even worked together later in the 1920s when Yule performed statistical analyses for Bateson.​[82]​ But there is little to show of any personal relationship between the men in the first decade of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Bateson did discuss the relationship between the ancestral law of heredity and the Mendelian principles of inheritance at several points in these early years, and there are several indications as to why Bateson would not have endorsed Yule’s suggestion. For instance, Bateson discussed the relationship between the Mendelian principles and the statistical methods of the biometricians in his 1909 publication Mendel’s Principles of Heredity.  In the very first chapter, Bateson argued, “Galton’s method failed for want of analysis.  His formula should in all probability be looked upon rather as an occasional consequence of the actual laws of heredity than in any proper sense one of those laws.”​[83]​  The Mendelian was admitting that the statistical law of ancestral heredity might occasionally match data, but only because Mendelian mechanisms occasionally produced such results. So sometimes the law of ancestral heredity just happened to be one special case of the Mendelian principles. This obviously contradicted the relationship between the two theories as proposed by Yule.  Yule began with the law of ancestral heredity at the base and then reduced the results of Mendelian crossing to find the Mendelian principles offer a special case of the more general biometric law.  Bateson would certainly have avoided such a proposal, as this was essentially the same suggestion Weldon made in his 1902 review of Mendel’s work. This same suggestion by Weldon elicited Bateson’s fear that interested biologists would neglect the study of Mendelian inheritance because the results were merely a special case of ancestral heredity.  This was not a case of personal hatred causing scientific blindness; this was a case of a scientist steering clear of a suggestion that would have reduced his research program to a mere footnote of biometrical statistics.
	Bateson also identified a second reason for disagreeing with a proposal such as Yule’s.  Remember that Yule began his discussion by demarcating the scientific realms of the two programs.  Biometry studied intra-racial heredity, and experimental hybridizations studied inter-racial heredity.  One problem with this conceptual distinction came from the fact that Yule never defined what he took to be a “race”.  Without this definition, there was no way to accurately tell what was inter-racial and what was intra-racial.  Bateson put great emphasis upon the role of discontinuous variations in the process of evolution, but he did not believe that the emergence of such variations necessarily placed the bearer of such a variation into another race.  Speaking directly to this issue, Bateson claimed, “in spite of their recent origin, such new combinations have just the same genetic properties and powers of transmission that are possessed by the types of long-selected breeds.”  Bateson therefore concluded, “The suggestion hazarded by several writers that a distinction may be drawn between inter-racial and intra-racial heredity has no foundation in fact.”​[84]​ Remember that Yule took his most important contribution to the discussion of the relationship between the ancestral law and the Mendelian principles to be the initial distinction between their domains of investigation based on his conceptual analysis of “heredity”. If this distinction is disregarded, as Bateson argued it should be, then Yule’s subsequent assessment of the relationship between biometry’s study of intra-racial heredity and Mendelism’s study of inter-racial heredity necessarily falls apart.

Conclusion 
This essay investigated the work of George Udny Yule in relation to both the evolutionary synthesis and the biometric-Mendelian debate. I have argued that it is misleading to claim that Yule put forth the first proposal for an evolutionary synthesis. Instead, Yule’s work is better understood as a reduction with a much-generalized form of the law of ancestral heredity at the base.  Understanding both Fisher and Yule’s work as a reduction rather than as a synthesis allows for a clearer appreciation of how the two biometricians’ theories were related, and where they importantly differed. Specifically, Fisher attempted to reduce the biometric law of ancestral heredity to the Mendelian principles of heredity, while Yule attempted the reduction in the opposite direction. I also claimed that it was understandable that Yule would have proposed such a relationship in 1902 and Fisher would have gone in the opposite direction in 1918 when we considered the important trends in the biological sciences that occurred in those 16 years separating the two works. 
With this reductive form of the proposed relationship understood, I attempted to demonstrate the variety of reasons why both the biometricians and the Mendelians would not endorse Yule’s hypothesis. Pearson, wedded to the stricter mathematical form of the ancestral law, found Yule’s more general form to be an oversimplification.  In contrast, Bateson disagreed with the idea that the Mendelian principles were merely a special case of the more general ancestral law and that the distinction between inter-racial and intra-racial heredity was not grounded in fact. In hindsight, we might commend Yule’s motivation for attempting to find a way to unite biometry and Mendelism, as many historians have done; he sought to mediate a divide that truly did need mediation. Unfortunately, his proposal brought with it a number of elements which neither the biometricians nor the Mendelians could have endorsed in the form that Yule presented it.   

Acknowledgments























^1	  Bateson, 1894
^2	  Pearson, 1900
^3	  The first, admittedly descriptive, account of the biometric-Mendelian debate came from Froggatt and Nevin, 1971. This was soon followed by Provine’s classic study The Origins of Population Genetics (Provine, 1971). The debate was then taken up by sociologists of science as evidence for the social nature of the scientific process (Farrall, 1975; MacKenzie, 1981; MacKenzie and Barnes, 1974; and MacKenzie and Barnes, 1979). For a critique of this social interpretation, see Roll-Hansen, 1980. The debate has also been used as a case to better understand the figures involved in the dispute. For example, Cock, 1973; Darden, 1977; and Olby, 1988 use the debate to assess the influence of Bateson, and Norton, 1973 and 1975; and Morrison, 2002 use the history to evaluate the biometricians.   
^4	  Bateson, 1886
^5	  Galton, 1889; Weldon, 1890 and 1892 
^6	  Olby, 1988
^7	  Bateson, 1894 
^8	  Weldon, 1894 
^9	  Bateson, 1895; Thiselton-Dyer, 1895; Weldon, 1895
^10	  Froggatt and Nevin, 1975
^11	  Bateson, 1901, 1902a, 1902b
^12	  Weldon, 1902
^13	  Weldon,  1902, 252 
^14	  Galton, 1897, 402
^15	  Bateson, 1902d
^16	  Bateson, 1902d, vi
^17	  Bateson, 1902d, x
^18	  Bateson, 1902d, xii
^19	  Yule to Pearson, 14 June 1902, Pearson Papers, University College London, Addn. 905, London, England.
^20	  Kendall, 1971
^21	  A sample of the various interpretations of the evolutionary synthesis can be found in The Evolutionary Synthesis, edited by Ernst Mayr and William Provine (1980).
^22	  Shapere, 1980, 398
^23	  Shapere, 1980, 398
^24	  Mather, 1941 
^25	  Wright, 1978, 5
^26	  Mayr, 1973, 149
^27	  Provine ,1971, 89
^28	  Provine, 1978, 82 
^29	  Falk, 1991, 474
^30	  Kevles, 1981, 196 
^31	  Ankeny, 2000; Kim, 1994
^32	  Fisher, 1918 
^33	  Fisher, 1918, 401 
^34	  Bennett, 1983
^35	  Bennett, 1983, 65
^36	  Huxley, 1942 
^37	  Sarkar, 1999, 106
^38	  Fisher, 1918, 421
^39	  Yule to Pearson, 10 September 1901, Pearson Papers, Addn. 905
^40	 Yule, 1902, 196 (Yule utilized italics to emphasize words in his discussion quite often.  All italicized words in quotes in this paper are from the original.)
^41	  Yule, 1902, 196
^42	 Yule, 1902, 199 
^43	 Falk, 1991; Provine, 1971 
^44	  Yule, 1902, 193
^45	  Yule, 1902, 201
^46	  Yule, 1902, 204 
^47	  Yule, 1902, 204
^48	  Yule, 1902, 202
^49	  Yule, 1902, 202
^50	  Yule, 1902, 202
^51	  Yule, 1902, 225
^52	  Yule, 1902, 225
^53	  Thanks to Bob Olby and an anonymous referee for helping me dissect the mistakes in Yule’s thought experiment. 
^54	  Yule, 1902, 223
^55	  Yule, 1902, 226
^56	  Yule, 1902, 226—227
^57	  Yule, 1902, 227
^58	  Mayr, 1973; Provine, 1971; and Wright, 1978
^59	  Johannsen, 1903
^60	  East, 1910; Nilsson-Ehle, 1909
^61	 For a discussion of Bateson’s rather unique employment of female colleagues during these formative years of genetics, see Richmond, 2001.
^62	  Yule to Pearson, 28 July 1901, Pearson Papers, Addn. 905.
^63	  Yule to Pearson, 18 August 1901, Pearson Papers, Addn. 905.
^64	  Pearson to Yule, 29 September 1901. Pearson Papers, Addn. 905.
^65	  Bateson, 1902c
^66	  Editorial, 1902, 2
^67	  Yule, 1906
^68	  Editorial, 1902, 2
^69	  Editorial, 1902, 2; Weldon, 1902; Bateson, 1902c
^70	  Pearson, 1903
^71	  Pearson, 1903, 212 
^72	  Pearson, 1903, 228 
^73	  Pearson, 1903, 229
^74	  Pearson, 1904
^75	  Froggatt and Nevin, 1971, 20
^76	  Pearson, 1904, 53
^77	  Pearson, 1904, 53
^78	  Pearson, 1904, 55
^79	  Pearson, 1904, 64
^80	  Pearson, 1904, 65
^81	  Pearson and Yule debated the form of the ancestral law and its implications for hybridization experiments in two more publications: Yule (1906), claimed that Pearson’s 1904 interpreted the pure gamete theory too strictly, and Pearson (1907), argued that Yule’s 1906 again misconstrued Pearson’s concept of the law of ancestral heredity.
^82	  See, for example, Bateson, 1923
^83	  Bateson, 1909, 6
^84	  Bateson, 1909, 49ReferencesAnkeny, Rachel. A. 2000. “Marvelling at the Marvel: The Supposed Conversion of A.D. Darbishire to Mendelism.” Journal of the History of Biology 33: 315—347.Bateson, William. 1886. “The Ancestry of the Chordates.” Quarterly Journal of Microscopical Science 26: 539—540.  ----------. 1894. Materials for the Study of Variation, with Treated with Especial Regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species. London: Macmillan Press.----------. 1895. “The Origin of the Cultivated Cineraria.” Nature 51: 605.  ----------. 1901. “Experiments in Plant Hybridization.” in The Scientific Papers of William Bateson, v. II, edited by R.C. Punnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1—3.   ----------. 1902a. “The Facts of Heredity in the Light of Mendel’s Discovery.” in The Scientific Papers of William Bateson, v. II, edited by R.C. Punnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29—68.  ----------. 1902b. “Note on the Resolution of Compound Characters by Cross-Breeding.” in The Scientific Papers of William Bateson, v. II, edited by R.C. Punnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.69—73.  ----------. 1902c. Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, a Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press----------. 1909. Mendel’s Principles of Heredity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press----------. 1923. “Genetics of Primula Sinensis.” in The Scientific Papers of William Bateson, v. II, edited by R.C. Punnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 335—371.   Bennett, J.H. 1983. Natural Selection, Heredity, and Eugenics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Cock, A.G. 1973. “William Bateson, Mendelism, and Biometry.” Journal of the History of Biology 6: 1—36.Darden, Lindley. 1977. “William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism.” Journal of the History of Biology 10: 87—106.East, Edward. 1910. “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That is Apparently Continuous.” American Naturalist 44: 65—82. Editorial. 1902. The New Phytologist 1: 1—3.   Falk, Raphael. 1991. “The Dominance of Traits in Genetic Analysis.” Journal of the History of Biology 24: 457-484.Farrall, Lyndsay. 1975. “Controversy and Conflict in Science: A Case Study—The English Biometric School and Mendel’s Laws.” Social Studies of Science 5: 269—301. Fisher, Ronald A. 1918. “The Correlation Between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance.” Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 52: 399-433.Froggatt, P. and Nevin, N.C. 1971. “The ‘Law of Ancestral Heredity’ and the Mendelian-Ancestrian Controversy in England, 1889-1906.” Journal of Medical Genetics 8: 1-36.Galton, Francis. 1897. “The Average Contribution of Each Several Ancestor to the Total Heritage of the Offspring.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 61: 401-413.----------. 1889. Natural Inheritance. London: Macmillan. Hull, David. 1985. “Darwinism as a Historical Entity: A Historiographic Proposal.” in David Kohn (ed.), The Darwinian Heritage, Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp.773—812.Huxley, Julian. 1942. Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. London: Allen and Unwin.  Johannsen, Wilhelm L. 1903. “Concerning Heredity in Populations and in Pure Lines.” in Selected Readings in Biology for Natural Sciences v3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.Kendall, Maurice G. 1971. Statistical Papers of George Udny Yule. London: Griffin.Kevles, Daniel. 1981. “Genetics in the United States and Great Britain 1890—1930: A Review with Speculations.” in C. Webster (ed.), Biology, Medicine, and Society 1840—1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 193—216. Kim, Kyung-Man. 1994. Explaining Scientific Consensus: The Case of Mendelian Genetics. New York: Guilford Press. Mackenzie, Donald. 1981. “Sociobiologists in Competition: The Biometry-Mendelism Controversy.” in C. Webster (ed.), Biology, Medicine, and Society 1840-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 243—288.  Mackenzie, Donald, and Barnes, Barry. 1974. “Historical and Sociological Analyses of Scientific Change: The Case of the Mendelian-Biometrician Controversy in England.” unpublished manuscript. ----------. 1979. “Scientific Judgement: The Biometrician-Mendelism Controversy.” in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds.), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Change, London: Sage. pp. 191—210. Mather, K. 1941. “Variation and Selection of Polygenic Characters.” Journal of Genetics 41:159.Mayr, Ernst. 1973. “The Recent Historiography of Genetics.” Journal of the History of Biology 6: 125-154.Mayr, Ernst, and Provine, William. 1980. The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Biology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 	Morrison, Margaret. 2002. “Modelling Populations: Pearson and Fisher on Mendelism and Biometry.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53: 39—68.Nilsson-Ehle, Nils Hermann. 1909. “Kreuzungsuntersuchungen an Hafer und Weizen.” Lunds Univ. Årsskrift n.s., series 2, 5(2):1-122.Norton, B.J. 1973. “The Biometric Defense of Darwinism.” Journal of the History of Biology 6: 283—316. ----------. 1975. “Biology and Philosophy: The Methodological Foundations of Biometry.” Journal of the History of Biology 8: 85—93.  Olby, Robert. 1988. “The Dimensions of Scientific Controversy: The Biometric-Mendelian Debate.” British Journal for the History of Science 22: 299-320.Pearson, Karl. 1900. The Grammar of Science (2nd ed.). London: A. and C. Black Publishing Co.----------. 1903. “The Law of Ancestral Heredity.” Biometrika 2: 211-236. ----------. 1904. “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution. XII. On a Generalised Theory of Alternative Inheritance, with Special Reference to Mendel’s Laws.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 203: 53-86.----------. 1907. “On the Theory of Inheritance of Quantitative Compound Characters on the Basis of Mendel’s Laws, by G.U. Yule: a Review.” Biometrika 5: 481—482.Provine, William B. 1971. The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Richmond, Marsha L. 2001. “Women in the Early History of Genetics: William Bateson and the Newnham College Mendelians, 1900—1910.” Isis 22: 55—90. Roll-Hansen, Nils. 1980. “The Controversy Between Biometricians and Mendelians: A Test Case for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.” Social Science Information 19: 501—517. Sarkar, Sahotra. 1998. Genetics and Reductionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Shapere, Dudley. 1980. “The Meaning of the Evolutionary Synthesis.” in The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Biology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Thistleton-Dyer, Sir William Turner. 1895. “Origin of the Cultivated Cineraria.” Nature 52: 3, 78, 128.Weldon, W. F. Raphael. 1890. “The Variations Occurring in Certain Decapod Crustacea I. Crangon vulgaris.” Proceedings of the Royal Society 47: 445—453.----------. 1892. “Certain Correlated Variations in Crangon vulgaris.” Proceedings of the Royal Society 51: 2—21.   ----------. 1894. “The Study of Animal Variation, a Review.” Nature 50: 25-26. ----------. 1895. “The Origin of the Cultivated Cineraria.” Nature 52: 54. ----------. 1902. “Mendel’s Laws of Alternative Inheritance in Peas.” Biometrika 1: 228-254.Wright, Sewall. 1978. “The Relation of Livestock Breeding to Theories of Evolution.” Journal of Animal Science 46: 1192-1200.Yule, George U. 1902. “Mendel’s Laws and Their Probable Relations to Intra-Racial Heredity.” The New Phytologist 1: 193-207, 222-238.----------. 1906. “On the Theory of Inheritance of Quantitative Compound Characters on the Basis of Mendel’s Laws—A Preliminary Note.” Report of the Conference on Genetics: 140-142.
